| WEEK # | TOPICS | READINGS |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Egoism | Butler, Joseph. Sermon XI in Fifteen Sermons. 1726. (PDF) |
| 2 | Egoism and the Belief-Desire Theory | Session 1 Fehr, Ernst, and Urs Fischbacher. "The Nature of Human Altruism." Nature 425 (2003): 785-91. Session 2 Smith, Michael. "The Humean Theory of Motivation." Mind, New Series 96, no. 381 (January 1987): 36-61. |
| 3 | Intention | Bratman, Michael. "Taking Plans Seriously." Social Theory and Practice 9, nos. 2-3 (Summer-Fall 1983): 271-287. Further Readings ———. "Intention and Means-End Reasoning." The Philosophical Review 90, no. 2 (April, 1981): 252-265. ———. "Two Faces of Intention." The Philosophical Review 93, no. 3 (July 1984): 375-405. Bratman's position is developed more fully in:  Bratman, Michael. Intention, Plans and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987. ISBN: 0674458184.For a quick way into this, see: Velleman, J. David. Review of Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, by Michael Bratman. The Philosophical Review 100, no. 2 (April 1991): 277-284. For an alternative view that tries to accommodate intentions within a belief/desire framework see: Ridge, Michael. "Humean Intentions." American Philosophical Quarterly 35, no. 2 (April 1998): 157-178. |
| 4 | Intention (cont.); Akrasia | Session 1 Velleman, David. Practical Reflection. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989, chapter 4. ISBN: 0691073376. Langton, Rae. "Intention as Faith." In Agency and Action. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55. Edited by John Hyman and Helen Steward. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 243-58. ISBN: 0521603560. Session 2 Davidson, Donald. "How is Weakness of the Will Possible?" In Essays on Actions and Events. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1980. ISBN: 0198246374.Richard Holton's Notes on Davidson's Account of Akrasia (PDF) |
| 5 | Akrasia and Weakness of Will | Session 1 Watson, Gary. "Skepticism about Weakness of Will." The Philosophical Review 86, no. 3 (July 1977): 316-339. Humberstone, Lloyd. "Wanting, Getting, Having." Philosophical Papers 19 (1990): 99-118. Session 2 Holton, Richard. "Intention and Weakness of Will." Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999): 241-62. |
| 6 | Strength of Will | Ainslie, George. "A Selectionist Model of the Ego: Implications for Self-Control." Chapter 6 in Disorders of Volition. Edited by Natalie Sebanz and Wolfgang Prinz. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006. ISBN: 0262195402. Holton, Richard. "How is Strength of Will Possible?" In Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Edited by Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003. ASIN: B000OOGPV0. Muraven, Mark, and Roy F. Baumeister. "Self-Regulation and Depletion of Limited Resources: Does Self-Control Resemble a Muscle?" Psychological Bulletin 126 (2000): 247-259. Muraven, Mark, Dianne M. Tice, and Roy F. Baumeister. "Self-Control as Limited Resource: Regulatory Depletion Patterns." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74, no. 3 (1998): 774-789. Further Readings Bratman, Michael E. "Planning and Temptation." Chapter 3 In Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999. ISBN: 0521637279.McClure, Samuel, David I. Laibson, George Loewenstein, and Jonathan D. Cohen. "Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate and Delayed Monetary Reward." Science 306 (October 15, 2004): 503-7. Ainslie, George, and John Monterosso. "A Marketplace in the Brain?" Science 306 (2004): 421-430. |
| 7 | Resolution and Rationality | Session 1 Kavka, G. "The Toxin Puzzle." Analysis 43 (1983): 33-6. Bratman, Michael E. "Toxin, Temptation and the Stability of Intention." Chapter 4 in Faces of Intention. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 58-90. ISBN: 0521637279.Session 2 Broome, John. "Are Intentions Reasons? And How Should We Cope with Incommensurable Values?" In Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier. Edited by Christopher Morris and Arthur Ripstein. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 98-120. ISBN: 0521781841.Holton, Richard. "Rational Resolve." Forthcoming in The Philosophical Review. |
| 8 | Addiction | Session 1 Yaffe, Gideon. "Recent Work on Addiction and Responsible Agency." Philosophy and Public Affairs 30, no. 2 (2002). Berridge, Kent C., and Terry E. Robinson. "The Mind of an Addicted Brain: Neural Sensitization of Wanting Versus Liking." Current Directions in Psychological Science 4, no. 3 (1995). Session 2 Watson, Gary. "Disordered Appetites." In Agency and Answerability. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004. ISBN: 0199272271.———. "Excusing Addiction." Law and Philosophy 18, no. 6 (1999): 589-619. |
| 9 | Free Will I | Session 1 Frankfurt, Harry G. "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." The Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 1 (January 14, 1971): 5-20. Watson, Gary. "Free Action and Free Will." Mind, New Series 96, no. 382 (April 1987): 145-172. Session 2 Frankfurt, Harry G. "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility." The Journal of Philosophy 66, no. 23 (December 4, 1969): 829-839. |
| 10 | Free Will II | Session 1 Strawson, Peter F. "Freedom and Resentment." Proceedings of the British Academy 48 (1961): 187-211. Wolf, Susan. "The Importance of Free Will." Mind, New Series 90, no. 359 (July 1981): 386-405. Session 2 Kane, Robert. "Two Kinds of Incompatibilism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50, no. 2 (December 1989): 219-254. |
| 11 | Identification and Autonomy | Session 1 Frankfurt, Harry. "Identification and Wholeheartedness." In The Importance of What We Care About. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1988. ISBN: 0521336112. ———. "The Faintest Passion." In Necessity, Volition and Love. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999. ISBN: 0521633958. Scanlon, T. M. "Reasons and Passions." Chapter 6 in The Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt. Edited by Sarah Buss and Lee Overton. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002. ISBN: 0262025132. Moran, Richard. "Frankfurt on Identification: Ambiguities of Activity in Mental Life." Chapter 7 in The Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt. Edited by Sarah Buss and Lee Overton. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002. ISBN: 0262025132. Session 2 Deci, E. L., and R. M. Ryan. "The support of autonomy and the control of behavior." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 53 (1987): 1024-1037. Further Reading Deci, E. L., and R. M. Ryan. "The 'what' and 'why' of goal pursuits: Human needs and the self-determination of behavior." Psychological Inquiry 11 (2000): 227-268. |
| 12 | Self-Deception | Session 1 Mele. "Real Self-Deception." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1997): 91-136. (Note: This is a pre-print, and does not include the peer commentary that appeared with the printed version.) Session 2 Holton, Richard. "What is the role of the self in self-deception?" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101, no. 1 (2001): 53. |
| 13 | Moral Motivation I | Session 1 Nichols, Shaun. "Norms with Feeling." Cognition 84 (2002): 221-236. Greene, Joshua D., Leigh E. Nystrom, Andrew D. Engell, John M. Darley, and Jonathan D. Cohen. "The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment." Neuron 44 (2004): 389-400. Session 2 Kennett, Jeanette. "Autism and Empathy." Philosophical Quarterly 52 (July 2002): 340-357. Roskies, Adina. "Are ethical judgments intrinsically motivational? Lessons from acquired sociopathy." Philosophical Psychology 16, no. 1 (March 2003): 51-66. Greene, Joshua D., Leigh E. Nystrom, Andrew D. Engell, John M. Darley, and Jonathan D. Cohen. "The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment." Neuron 44 (2004): 389-400. |
| 14 | Moral Motivation, Personality and Moral Testimony | Session 1 Doris, John M. "Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics." Noûs 32, no. 4 (December 1998): 504-530. Bem, Daryl. "On the Uncommon Wisdom of our Lay Personality Theory." Psychological Inquiry 3 (1992): 82-84. Kamtekar, Rachana. "Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of our Character." Ethics 114, no. 3 (2004): 458-491. Session 2 Jones, Karen. "Second-Hand Moral Knowledge." The Journal of Philosophy 96, no. 2 (February 1999): 55-78. |
Table of Contents
Study Materials
Readings
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This section includes all the required readings for the course as well as suggested readings. Most weeks are divided into two class sessions; session 1 and session 2 in the table below, indicate separate sessions in a given week.